This paper provides evidence on how wage inequality among workers affects the labor movement using three complementary research designs: a vignette experiment with union organizers, a natural policy experiment that increased wage inequality among Wisconsin school teachers, and an information intervention during the 2023 Writers Guild of America strike. Across all studies, we find that inequality undermines union strength through multiple channels. First, workers with high individual bargaining power are more likely to withdraw support in unequal environments, preferring individual over collective bargaining. Second, union organizers facing hypothetical choices strategically respond to inequality in ways that may preserve membership but limit redistribution, such as shifting their campaign away from wages and choosing smaller, more homogeneous bargaining units.

Political debates often invoke “rights” to justify public transfers (e.g., the right to health care), whereas economists use welfarist frameworks which evaluate transfers’ impacts based on how they affect people’s utility. We conduct real-stakes online experiments that isolate non-welfarist from welfarist motives, and find sizable non-welfarist preferences to provide health care and legal aid to the indigent. 73% of participants make choices which are incompatible with welfarism. Non-welfarist concerns are weaker but still pervasive with neutral comparison goods. Additional experiments highlight drivers of non-welfarist motives and a key policy implication: non-welfarist concerns make Social Welfare Functions less progressive.